Wil Wa lu chow al de sa rro llar su ar gu men to a fa vor de una con cep ción pro pia del com mon law para las cons ti tu cio nes y para el ju di cial re view, sos tie ne que exis te una dis tin ción de prin ci pio en tre las "opi nio nes" de la co mu ni dad o sus "sim ples pre fe ren cias mo ra les" y los com pro mi sos mora les "ver da de ros" o "au tén ti cos". Ade más, sos tie ne que para los jue ces es po si ble iden ti fi car los com pro mi sos mo ra les au tén ti cos de una co muni dad y apli car los mis mos en la de ci sión de ca sos con cre tos. Si tie ne razón, en ton ces los jue ces al de ci dir ca sos con cre tos so bre el al can ce de los de re chos cons ti tu cio na les no ca na li zan sus pro pios es tán da res mo rales sub je ti vos a las de ci sio nes. En este es tu dio ana li zo el uso que hace Wa lu chow de la dis tin ción en tre opi nio nes mo ra les y com pro mi sos mo rales. Argu men to en pri mer tér mi no que la dis tin ción pre su po ne una me todo lo gía des crip ti va de la in ter pre ta ción cons ti tu cio nal, y su gie ro que no obs tan te lo an te rior, la me to do lo gía de in ter pre ta ción de los de re chos cons ti tu cio na les es cons truc ti va e im pli ca por par te de los in tér pre tes y jue ces un ra zo na mien to "eva lua ti vo y de jus ti fi ca ción" sus tan ti vo. Pos terior men te ar gu men to que la dis tin ción en tre opi nio nes mo ra les y compro mi sos mo ra les no tie ne el al can ce que pre ten de y re quie re el tra ba jo de Wa lu chow y si se mo di fi ca, en ton ces se con vier te en una dis tin ción sus tan ti va. Una con cep ción sus tan ti va de au ten ti ci dad le ge ne ra un proble ma a Wa lu chow por que de bi li ta su ex pli ca ción pu ra men te pro ce dimen tal de un auto-go bier no de mo crá ti co.
In A Com mon Law The ory of Ju di cial Re view, 1 W. J. Waluchow de vel ops an ar gu ment that is de signed to block an ob jec tion to Bills of Rights and ju di cial re view. The objec tion is that in al low ing judges to de cide the ap pli ca tion and scope of Bills of Rights, a so ci ety in ev i ta bly al lows the sub sti tu tion of judges' sub jec tive moral views for the moral views of a dem o crat i cally elected ma jor ity (for ex am ple, p. 219). 2 Waluchow writes:
Why should judges de cid ing moral ques tions un der a sys tem of ju di cial re view be re quired, for rea sons of de moc racy, fairness and the like, to re spect the com mu nity's moral opin ions on the mat ter -as op posed to the com mu nity's true moral com mit ments in re flec tive equi lib rium? Why should they bend to the com mu nity's inauthentic wishes, not its au then tic ones?... [J] udges are not phi los o pher-kings with a pipe line to moral truth. But they may be in a very good po si tion to deter mine the re quire ments of a com mu nity's true moral commit ments and au then tic wishes in par tic u lar cases. If this is so... then there is noth ing amiss in ask ing judges to en force these com mit ments and wishes against the mere opin ions and inauthentic wishes of the pos si bil ity mis guided pub lic gripped by evaluative dis so nance. This is no more prob lematic than ac knowl edg ing the duty of re spon si ble leg is la tors... to do the same (pp. 225-6).
The de bate over Charters and ju di cial re view is in essence a de bate over the na ture of de moc ra cies. The question is a sim ple one: are ma jor i ties in de moc ra cies sub ject to moral con straints? Pro po nents of Charters and ju di cial re view typ i cally claim they are, and that en trench ing the con straints in a Bill of Rights with ju di cial re view is the best in sti tu tional de vice for ef fec tive pro tec tion of the constraints. (Note, how ever, that there is no en tail ment re la tion here: one might take the po si tion that there are moral constraints on ma jor i ties in de moc ra cies but that Charters and/or ju di cial re view are not ef fec tive means to in sure that these con straints are met.) Crit ics of Charters and ju di cial re view how ever ar gue that there are no sub stan tive constraints on what ma jor i ties can do in de moc ra cies. Ma jor ities are con strained by processes and procedures only, not by substantive moral principles.
Waluchow takes a new and re fresh ing ap proach to this de bate. He at tempts to work out a po si tion de fend ing Charters and ju di cial re view while at the same time avoiding the pit falls of hav ing to en dorse a sub stan tive con ception of de moc racy. This is a con sid er able strength of his posi tion. In par tic u lar, the dis tinc tion be tween inauthentic moral opin ions and au then tic moral com mit ments that is ar tic u lated in the book is a sig nif i cant step for ward. It allows him to adopt a purely pro ce dural ac count of the constraints on ma jor i ties in de moc ra cies be cause for him majoritarian pro ce dures are not dem o cratic -i.e. are not self-gov ern ing pro ce dures -when they are based on inauthentic moral opin ions. The dis tinc tion also de flates prom i nent ar gu ments of crit ics of Bills of Rights and ju dicial re view (fol low ing Waluchow, 'Crit ics'), no ta bly the ar gument from dis agree ment. If much, if not all, moral dis agreement is dis agree ment be tween inauthentic opin ions and au then tic moral com mit ments, then it is not re ally disagree ment at all. Dis count ing moral opin ions does not in terfere il le git i mately with cit i zens' right to gov ern them selves in a de moc racy be cause moral opin ions are inauthentic; they are not the pref er ences of agents act ing au ton o mously. More over, the dis tinc tion en ables Waluchow to adopt what I term a 'de scrip tive' meth od ol ogy of con sti tu tional in ter pre -ta tion. In mak ing de ci sions on the ba sis of the au then tic moral com mit ments of a com mu nity, in ter pret ers (e.g. judges) are, by hy poth e sis, de scrib ing one set of ex pressed wishes of a com mu nity. Since, there fore, judges are in the busi ness of em pir i cal de scrip tion, not of 'im pos ing' their sub jec tive opin ion on a sub stan tive and con tested is sue, Waluchow's po si tion should sat isfy Critics.
My pa per ex am ines these as pects of Waluchow's ar gument. For Waluchow, par a digm cases of inauthenticity, at least the com mu nity case, are those in which peo ple's reason ing ca pac i ties are dis torted, for ex am ple, through fear, prej u dice, emo tional dis tur bance, drug or al co hol in duced stu por, etc. As I ex plain, these fail ings are char ac ter ized as epistemic fail ings of agents or com mu ni ties. I ar gue how ever than some of the fail ings that Waluchow de scribes as inauthentic are in fact sub stan tive moral fail ing of agents. If so, then he im plic itly builds into his po si tion quite a strong, sub stan tive, con cep tion of au ton omy. This sub stantive con cep tion, while it is de fen si ble, will not be ac cept able to Crit ics. Nei ther will it al low Waluchow to main tain his purely procedural account of democratic self-government.
In the first sec tion of the pa per, I pro vide an ex po si tion of the role played in Waluchow's ar gu ment of the moral opinions -moral com mit ments dis tinc tion. For Waluchow, the dis tinc tion is im por tant in both leg is la tive and adjudicative con texts. I ex plain the sig nif i cance of the dis tinc tion, in par tic u lar its role in de flat ing the ar gu ments of Crit ics. The sec ond sec tion is a crit i cal ex am i na tion of the pos si ble meth od ol o gies of con sti tu tional in ter pre ta tion on Waluchow's 'liv ing tree' or 'com mon law' ac count of Bills of Rights. I ar gue that there are three broad ap proaches pos sible, which I call sub jec tive, de scrip tive, and con struc tive. I an a lyze Waluchow's meth od ol ogy as de scrip tive; if it can be main tained, it would have con sid er able ad van tages in respond ing to the ob jec tion. I sug gest how ever, that the meth od ol ogy of in ter pre ta tion in Bills of Rights cases is con -struc tive. 3 In short, it in volves sub stan tive, 'evaluative and jus ti fi ca tory' 4 rea son ing by in ter pret ers and judges. I claim that a con struc tive ap proach is better than a de scrip tive ap proach in ex plain ing the com mon law model that is adopted by Waluchow. This does not mean, how ever, that it col lapses into the sub jec tive. In sec tion three, I ex plore the moral opin ions-moral com mit ments dis tinc tion in de tail. I ar gue that the dis tinc tion ei ther can not to the work that Waluchow at trib utes to it, or if it is to be mod i fied to do the work, it be comes a sub stan tive dis tinc tion. A sub stan tive con cep tion of au then tic ity cre ates a prob lem for Waluchow in that it un der mines his purely pro ce dural ac count of dem o cratic self-gov er nance. In the fi nal sec tion, I briefly address the ques tion: given that a con struc tive meth od ol ogy, as a well as a sub stan tive con cep tion of democracy, seem necessary in many of the contested situations of constitutional morality of concern to Waluchow, what should we conclude about judicial review? SECTION 1. I. WALUCHOW'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL OPINIONS AND MORAL COMMITMENTS (i) Au then tic and inauthentic pref er ences. Waluchow in troduces the idea of au then tic ity in Chap ter 3. Con sider a med i cal eth ics case in which a pa tient, who is fully informed about her med i cal con di tion, and the op tions available to her, says that she wants to die. Waluchow imag ines a re sponse to the pa tient in the following terms:
[A] daugh ter is moved to de clare "I know what she has just said, but that can't be my mother talk ing! She says she wants to die, but she has al ways be lieved in a duty to God to pre serve one's life at all costs. To sur ren der to death in this way would be in her eyes to in sult God -some thing she would never ever wish to do." In such a case, the patient might be de scribed as speak ing or act ing out of char ac ter. One might go so far as to say that in such cases of "evaluative dis so nance" it is "her con di tion" speaking, not her. If so, then one might be in clined to say that her con sent can not pos si bly be valid be cause it is inauthentic ( p. 87).
This kind of case sets up two po ten tial con flicts: first, a con flict be tween the mother's ex pressed wishes and her best in ter ests; and sec ondly, a po ten tial con flict be tween her ex pressed wishes and her 'true' or au then tic com mitments. It is this sec ond po ten tial con flict that is the fo cus of our dis cus sion here. Waluchow sug gests that there are at least three nec es sary con di tions of a wish be ing au then tic: (i) it must be ex pressed sin cerely; (ii) it must be 'based on ad e quate knowl edge and un der stand ing' (p. 89) and (iii) it must com ply with the 'evaluative dis so nance con di tion', that is, the con di tion that the 'wish ex pressed be con sis tent with the ba sic be liefs, com mit ments, val ues and set tled pref er ences of the agent' (Ibid.). Fail ing the evaluative dis sonance con di tion may be due to a fail ure of self-knowl edge, and hence may fall un der the sec ond con di tion. The ex ample of the mother above may be in this cat e gory. How ever, there are al ter na tive ways of fail ing the evaluative dis sonance con di tion. Waluchow claims that an agent 'might be fully aware of the evaluative dis so nance but might be tempo rarily over come by pro found fear or some other emo tional dis tur bance ' (p. 90) . Sup pose some one in a drunken state is 'fully aware of the risks of drunk driv ing and the ex tent to which such con duct vi o lates [his] fun da men tal con victions and set tled pref er ences' (p. 90) yet still de mands to drive him self home. On Waluchow's ac count the ex pressed wish -a 'drink-en hanced, ma cho pref er ence' -is inauthentic and hence the agent's friends are justified in removing his keys to prevent him from driving himself home.
(ii) Atticus and the lan guage law. Once hav ing in tro duced the dis tinc tion be tween inauthentic and au then tic pref er -ences, Waluchow moves from the case of in di vid ual agents' wishes to those of a po lit i cal com mu nity. What is the ob liga tion of an elected rep re sen ta tive in the face of the elec torate's ex pressed wishes? Is it ever per mis si ble to over ride the ex pressed wishes of the elec tor ate when their ex pressed wishes con flict with (i) their best in ter ests or (ii) their authen tic in ter ests? Waluchow sets aside the ques tion of whether it is jus ti fied for a rep re sen ta tive to pa ter na listically over ride an elec tor ate's ex pressed wishes in the name of their best in ter ests. Rather, he ar gues for the weaker posi tion that it is some times a le git i mate re quire ment for a rep re sen ta tive to over ride 'one set of ex pressed wishes -the inauthentic ones -for the sake of honoring other expressed wishes, the genuine ones. ' (p. 97) .
Con sider the ex am ple of an imag i nary de moc racy, Demos, which con tains (among oth ers) a con stit u ency, Athenia, whose elected rep re sen ta tive is Atticus. Athenia and De mos con tain a small mi nor ity, the Ve nu sians, who have a dis tinct lin guis tic, re li gious, moral and cul tural iden tity. Sup pose that the par lia ment in De mos -supported by the ma jor ity in Athenia -wishes to en act a language law de ny ing Ve nu sians 'the right to use the Ve nu sian lan guage…de spite the fact that Ve nu sians are flu ent in no other lan guage' (p. 98). Waluchow can vasses var i ous pos sible rea sons of the ma jor ity might have for sup port ing the law. First, the law may be jus ti fied in the eyes of the ma jority be cause it will pro duce 'the great est good for the greatest num ber': it will be con ve nient, eco nom i cally ef fi cient, and so forth (p. 99). On this jus ti fi ca tion, the ma jor ity either does not ap pre ci ate the full ex tent of the harm to the in ter ests of the Ve nu sians or is in dif fer ent to the in ter ests of the Ve nu sians in pro hib it ing the Ve nu sian lan guage. Sec ondly, the ma jor ity may be mo ti vated by 'sim ple prej udice': the ma jor ity in Athenia 'might be deeply prej u diced against Ve nu sians and be pre pared to deny them full rights to free ex pres sion; even when the costs are 'quite min i mal' (p. 100). Thirdly, the ma jor ity might be fear ful of Ve nu sians as 'the Other.' Here Waluchow uses the par al lel of the intern ment of Jap a nese dur ing WWII. 'Fear of the un known… [led to] deep sus pi cion and op pres sive mea sures' against Jap a nese and those of Jap a nese de scent (p. 100). How should Atticus -who after all must consider himself to be the representative of the majority in Athenia -respond to these reasons for voting for the proposed law?
Waluchow ar gues that Atticus should treat the ma jor ity's wish to en act the lan guage law as inauthentic. The lan guage law fails the evaluative dis so nance con di tion for this po lit ical com mu nity: 'we have dis like, prej u dice and ha tred fuelled by fear, to gether with a de mand for ac tion that in troduces sig nif i cant evaluative dis so nance. De mos, we may sup pose, is a com mu nity that val ues moral equal ity. In other words, among its ba sic com mit ments is the be lief that all per sons are en ti tled, as full mem bers of the moral commu nity, to what Ron ald Dworkin calls "equal con cern and re spect"' (p. 104). De mos' true and au then tic com mit ment to equal ity is in com pat i ble with de ny ing a mi nor ity the right to free ex pres sion -at least when that de nial, as it is by hypoth e sis in this case, is based on fear, prej u dice, in dif ference or lack of appreciation of the harm to the minority's interests.
(iii) Inauthentic in puts de feat dem o cratic self-gov er nance. Waluchow's ar gu ment, how ever, does not end here. Although Atticus be lieves that the law is mor ally wrong, he is still ret i cent about vot ing against it for the fol low ing reasons: 'De mos is a de moc racy, and what ever else we might mean in call ing a sys tem dem o cratic, we mean that it is a sys tem where "the peo ple" are the ones who ul ti mately rule... [R]ight or wrong, Athe nians have by way of a clear ma jor ity con sen sus, de ter mined that their wish is to see a lan guage law en acted' (p. 105). One way of re but ting this ob jec tion would be to adopt a sub stan tive or 'con sti tu tional' con cep tion of de moc racy. This kind of con cep tion is out -come-re lated. 5 In other words, majoritarian pro ce dures are truly dem o cratic only to the ex tent that they pro duce outcomes that sat isfy in de pend ent nec es sary con di tions of democ racy, for ex am ple 'the prin ci ple of equal sta tus' (p. 108). This con cep tion of de moc racy has been the tar get of Crit ics of Charters and ju di cial re view. 6 The al ter na tive con cep tion of de moc racy -one that is ac cept able to Crit ics -is that it is purely pro ce dural or pro cess-re lated. 7 The de vice of evaluative dis so nance al lows Waluchow to ar gue that even on the lat ter con cep tion of de moc racy, Atticus may le git i mately dis count majoritarian pref er ences when they are inauthentic. He claims that: majoritarian pro ce dures are not demo cratic -i.e. are not self-gov ern ing pro ce dures -when they are based on inauthentic wishes (pp. 111-12, my for mu lation). They are not self-gov ern ing in the same way that de cisions made agents who are drunk are not self-gov ern ing, or the de ci sions of the mother that she wishes to die are not self-gov ern ing. A nec es sary con di tion of self-gov ern ment is au then tic ity, and, in all three cases, the ex pressed wishes fail this con di tion. I re turn to this ar gu ment in sec tion 3 of the paper.
(iv) Con sti tu tional mo ral ity and the ar gu ments of Crit ics. In Chap ter 6 of the book, Waluchow out lines the heart of the ar gu ment for ju di cial re view. One as pect of this ar gu ment em ploys a dis tinc tion be tween a com mu nity's moral opinions and its moral com mit ments. Waluchow points out that there is in fact a three way dis tinc tion within the mo ral ity of a com mu nity: first, a com mu nity's inauthentic moral wishes or opin ions; sec ondly, a com mu nity's 'true' mo ral ity 'broadly con strued;' and thirdly, a com mu nity's con sti tutional mo ral ity. The lat ter is 'the set of moral norms and con sid ered judg ments prop erly at trib ut able to a com mu nity as a whole as rep re sent ing its true com mit ments, but with the fol low ing ad di tional prop erty: They are in some way tied to its con sti tu tional law and prac tices' (p. 227). One way of un der stand ing a com mu nity's con sti tu tional mo ral ity would be to adopt Ron ald Dworkin's no tion of the set of prin ci ples of po lit i cal mo ral ity im plicit in a par tic u lar area of law. Waluchow is care ful to dis tin guish, how ever, the Dworkinian no tion of a po lit i cal mo ral ity that is best jus ti fied from a moral point of view from the po lit i cal mo ral ity that explains the com mu nity's ac tual laws and in sti tu tions. He adopts the lat ter as his ac count of con sti tu tional mo ral ity: for ex am ple, 'much of early twen ti eth cen tury South Af ri can law [pre sup posed] rac ist moral norms and be liefs. Such norms and be liefs were part of that com mu nity's (de plorable) "con sti tu tional mo ral ity"' (Ibid).
How do we dis tin guish be tween moral opin ions and true moral com mit ments that con sti tute a com mu nity's con stitu tional mo ral ity? Waluchow em ploys two the o ret i cal devices, both drawn in broad terms from the work of Rawls. First, he ar gues that even if there is sig nif i cant dis agreement within a com mu nity over moral opin ions, there is a de gree of over lap ping con sen sus over true moral com mitments. Sec ond, as in the per sonal case, only those moral opin ions that are in re flec tive equi lib rium -that are con sistent with moral prin ci ples held by the com mu nity -will be con sid ered to be true moral com mit ments. Con sider the mother above: her wish to die is not au then tic be cause it is in con sis tent with her deeply held moral prin ci ples, or to put it an other way, with what she would be com mit ted to un der con di tions of max i mal ra tio nal ity, ev i dence, etc. Simi larly, a com mu nity's moral opin ions, such as those that sus pected ter ror ists should be locked up in def i nitely without charge, are in con sis tent with the com mu nity's deep moral prin ci ples. Waluchow ac knowl edges that in some cases dis agree ment re mains about what the moral com mitments them selves. He writes: 'on some highly con test able ques tions, for ex am ple ques tions con cern ing the mo ral ity of abor tion, there may be no over lap ping con sen sus…If so then the com mu nity's con sti tu tional mo ral ity will fail to pro vide de ter mi nate an swers in Char ter cases…But there is lit tle rea son to think that this will al ways be so. ' (pp. 228-9) . For Waluchow, then, cases of gen u ine, sub stan tive disagreement are in the minority.
Waluchow's no tion of con sti tu tional mo ral ity there fore ad dresses two im por tant ar gu ments of Crit ics of ju di cial review. The first is the ar gu ment from dis agree ment, in par ticu lar the claim that be cause sub stan tive dis agree ments about moral rights go 'all the way down,' 8 the only dem ocrat i cally le git i mate way to re solve the is sue is by ap peal ing to par lia ment, that is, to the elected rep re sen ta tives of the peo ple. The no tion of over lap ping con sen sus how ever rejects the po si tion that dis agree ment goes all the way down. There is some set of moral prin ci ples which we agree on and which in prin ci ple can be iden ti fied by judges (or others). The no tion of au then tic moral con vic tions in re flec tive equi lib rium also ad dresses the ar gu ment from dis agreement. It shows that some dis agree ment -in deed per haps much dis agree ment-can be dis counted be cause it is disagree ment over moral opin ions or be tween moral opin ions and moral com mit ments. Dis agree ment when it is based on mere opin ion can be dis counted be cause it is only ap par ent dis agree ment; it is not gen u ine dis agree ment over sub stantive is sues. A sec ond ar gu ment of Crit ics, the ar gu ment from au ton omy, re lies di rectly on a prem ise about cit i zens' auton omy. Jeremy Waldron claims that there is an in ter nal con tra dic tion within the case for Bills of Rights and ju di cial re view. 9 On the one hand, the at tri bu tion of rights to cit izens pre sup poses that they are au ton o mous, ra tio nal agents de serv ing of rights; on the other, the in sti tu tion of ju di cial re view un der mines the au ton o mous agency of cit izens to re solve moral con tro ver sies about rights for themselves, be cause it al lo cates this power to a small group of 112 elite judges. Thus Charters to gether with ju di cial re view both at trib ute and deny au ton omy to agents. The moral opin ions -moral com mit ments dis tinc tion could be used to re spond to this ar gu ment. If ex press ing a 'mere opin ion' is not a man i fes ta tion of an agent's au ton omy, then there is no ob li ga tion on any one, ei ther a judge or a leg is la tor, to respect the opin ion. Resolving a putative 'dispute about rights' by discounting a mere opinion does not undermine a citizen's democratic right to have her voice count or to autonomously resolve the dispute herself.
SECTION 2. II. METHODOLOGY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A cru cial in gre di ent in Waluchow's de fense of Charters and ju di cial re view is his 'com mon law' or 'liv ing tree' concep tion of Charters. In this sec tion I ex am ine the meth od olo gies of in ter pre ta tion that are avail able on a com mon law model. I ar gue that Waluchow's meth od ol ogy is (most likely) de scrip tive, whereas the best ac count of in ter pre ta tion on the common law model is constructive.
(i) The 'liv ing tree' model. For Waluchow, Charters do not con sti tute a 'pre-com mit ment' or agree ment about cit i zens' rights that is fixed at the time of fram ing or adop tion. Rather, the rights enu mer ated in a Char ter evolve to re flect the chang ing na ture of the de moc racy over time: '[i] t is an in stru ment that must be al lowed to grow and adapt to new con tem po rary cir cum stances and evolv ing nor ma tive beliefs, in clud ing those about jus tice' (p. 183). Waluchow's posi tion raises the ques tion of the re la tion ship be tween the writ ten Char ter and evolv ing con sti tu tional mo ral ity. He notes that his com mon law con cep tion 'seeks to com bine the rel a tive fix ity of en trenched writ ten law, and the adaptabil ity char ac ter is tic of the com mon law' (Ibid.). 10 I will not be con cerned here to ei ther en dorse or cri tique this con cep tion of com mon law rea son ing, or the plau si bil -ity of ap ply ing the model to Charters and stat ute law. Rather, I want to ex plore the meth od ol ogy of con sti tu tional in ter pre ta tion, broadly con strued, that is pre sup posed by the com mon law con cep tion of Charters. As Waluchow points out, the liv ing tree con cep tion of Charters rules out the o ries of con sti tu tional in ter pre ta tion that adopt a 'fixed point' anal y sis of Con sti tu tions and bills of rights. This includes all ver sions of originalism, 11 even the mod er ate versions, such as the 'ut ter ance mean ing' intentionalism of Jeffrey Golds worthy. 12 It also rules out, for ex am ple, ap parently in ter me di ate ap proaches such as the one adopted in early ar ti cles by Ron ald Dworkin. 13 On these in ter me di ate ac counts, it is granted that con sti tu tional lan guage, es pecially the lan guage of Bills of Rights, is broad and ab stract. How ever it is ar gued that the broad, ab stract lan guage corre sponds to an 'ab stract in ten tion' of the found ers of Consti tu tions. The fram ers of the Equal Pro tec tion amend ment of the United States Con sti tu tion, for ex am ple, had an inten tion to en shrine an ab stract prin ci ple of equal ity. For these au thors, the ab stract in ten tion is the in ten tion to entrench what ever set of re quire ments 'equal ity' de notes in our best moral the ory of equal ity. This may look like an evo lu tion ary con cep tion, but it is not. 'Equal ity' denoted the same set of moral requirements 200 years ago as it does today, even if the then legal experts did not realize it.
How ever, there are three broad meth od ol o gies of con stitu tional in ter pre ta tion that are com pat i ble with the common law model of Charters: sub jec tive, de scrip tive and construc tive. The first, sub jec tive meth od ol ogy, claims that the only way of re solv ing con tested is sues of the in ter pre ta tion of rights is by re sort ing to an in ter preter's sub jec tive moral po si tion. Sam uel Free man use fully dis tin guishes be tween dif fer ent prac ti cal points of view. The sub jec tive meth od ol -114 ogy, in Free man's terms, em ploys 'par tic u lar' rea sons, the rea sons that are 'as cer tained from our in di vid ual per spectives, where we see our selves as sin gle agents with fixed (final) ends fac ing a range of op tions from which we must choose. These rea sons are ul ti mately based on our par tic ular ends, as given by our pri vate, sec tar ian, and group inter ests.' 14 Crit ics of Charters and ju di cial re view typ i cally think that once ab stract moral prin ci ples are en trenched in Bills of Rights, and the power to de cide con tested cases is al lo cated to judges, sub jec tive in ter pre ta tion of this sort is in ev i ta ble. How ever I ar gue that the de scrip tive and construc tive meth od ol o gies of in ter pre ta tion pro vide gen u ine alter na tives to the sub jec tive model. The dis tinc tion be tween de scrip tive and con struc tive meth od ol o gies of in ter pre ta tion cor re sponds to a dis tinc tion that is drawn within the method ol ogy of law more broadly. A de scrip tive meth od ol ogy of law is at trib uted to ex clu sive and in clu sive positivists whereas a 'evaluative and jus ti fi ca tory' meth od ol ogy of law is at trib uted to Ron ald Dworkin. 15 The de scrip tive meth od ol ogy claims that in ter pret ers must at tempt to de scribe a com mu nity's ac tu ally held val ues and prin ci ples, to de scribe, for ex am ple, its con sti tu tional moral ity. Once in ter pret ers latch on to the 'true' moral commit ments of a com mu nity, many of the con tested ques tions dis ap pear. A de scrip tive meth od ol ogy, of which originalism is one im por tant ex am ple, has an enor mous ad van tage over al ter na tives be cause in ter prets can claim the neu tral ity that has been sought by so many the o rists of in ter pre tation. 16 I sug gest that Waluchow's meth od ol ogy of in ter pre ta tion is an ex am ple of de scrip tive meth od ol ogy. Four as pects of his dis cus sion come to gether to con sti tute the de scrip tive ap proach. First, he ar gues that there is an ex ist ing (and there fore de scrib able) 'over lap ping con sen sus' within dem o -cratic com mu ni ties; that is, there is agree ment on the broad moral prin ci ples to which the com mu nity is com mitted. Sec ondly, he claims that, in cases of con tro versy, it is le git i mate to over ride 'one set of ex pressed wishes -the inauthentic ones-for the sake of hon or ing other ex pressed wishes, the gen u ine ones' (p. 97). In other words, the gen uine wishes can be iden ti fied and de scribed by leg is la tors and judges. Thirdly, Waluchow dis tances his po si tion from that of Dworkin. As noted above, he de scribes Dworkin's no tion of po lit i cal mo ral ity as the one that is best jus ti fied from a moral point of view, whereas his own ex plains the com mu nity's ac tual laws and in sti tu tions. Fourthly, he implic itly of fers in de pend ent, ap par ently non-nor ma tive cri teria for iden ti fy ing inauthentic pref er ences and opin ions. Moral pref er ences that are fu elled by fear, ha tred and preju dice are ex am ples of pref er ences that can be dis counted as inauthentic. These are de scrip tive, em pir i cal fea tures of agents. So, four el e ments of Waluchow's cur rent the ory point to a de scrip tive meth od ol ogy of con sti tu tional in terpre ta tion. In ad di tion, a de scrip tive meth od ol ogy is supported by Waluchow's the ory of law broadly un der stood, that is, by his com mit ment to in clu sive pos i tiv ism. 17 I now turn to the con struc tive meth od ol ogy. On con structive mod els of con sti tu tional in ter pre ta tion, in ter pret ers are adopt ing a nor ma tive and jus ti fi ca tory meth od ol ogy, one in which a sub stan tive an swer to a ques tion of moral prin ci ple is be ing ar tic u lated and de fended. They the o rize about what the com mu nity would or should be lieve, of ten em ploy ing some set of ide al ized con di tions, and at tempt to re fine what we, a com mu nity, mean by a con cept in a way that 'improves' the con cept rel a tive to fac tors such as the goals of the prac tice in ques tion. (Hence this ap proach may also be termed 'ameliorative.' 18 ) One ex am ple of a con struc tive meth od ol ogy is Free man's no tion of 'pub lic' rea son, a prac -ti cal point of view that he con trasts with the par tic u lar or sub jec tive point of view de scribed above. Free man says: '[I]f rea sons are to serve a jus ti fi ca tory role in a de moc racy, they must ul ti mately be ac cept able to ev ery one from a public point of view… [This] is a po si tion where free per sons abstract from their in di vid ual per spec tive and the rea sons and in ter ests that set them apart and re flect upon mea sures that re al ize their in ter ests as dem o cratic cit i zens.' 19 No tice that al though Crit ics as sume that the con struc tive pro ject will col lapse into a sub jec tive one, this is not the case. The sub jec tive ap proach en tails that in ter pret ers always in ter pret for their own, par tic u lar, rea sons and purposes. As Waluchow use fully points out sev eral times in his book, judges are con strained by a 'good faith re quire ment:' '[an in ter preter] may be free, in the de facto sense, to choose an in ter pre ta tion that she thinks wrong but that serves her pur poses. But she is not free in the rel e vant norma tive sense. She is con sti tu tion ally re quired to in terpret…hon estly in the best way she can and to act on that in ter pre ta tion' (pp. 39-40). For ex am ple, if neu tral ity in inter pre ta tion cor re sponds to some con cep tion of pub lic rather than par tic u lar rea son, good faith re quires judges to in ter pret on the ba sis of their best un der stand ing of pub lic rea son -i.e. on the ba sis of prin ci ples ap pli ca ble to all cit izens -and not on the ba sis of their par tic u lar and sub jective pur poses. More over, it is worth re it er at ing Waluchow's im por tant dis tinc tion be tween a de ci sion that re lies on the per sonal view of judges or in ter pret ers, and a de ci sion that at tempts to pro mote a judge's sub jec tive pur poses and goals (see e.g. p. 231). Pro po nents of the sub jec tive meth od ol ogy of ten con flate these two kinds of de ci sion. As Waluchow points out, sci en tific de ci sions rely on the 'per sonal judgments of sci en tists about what the ev i dence es tab lishes' (p. 231) but it does not fol low that sci en tific con clu sions are ex pres sions of sub jec tive rea sons and goals of in di vid ual scientists.
The com mon law model de fended by Waluchow is better de scribed as em ploy ing a con struc tive, not a de scrip tive, meth od ol ogy. To see this, con sider the anal y sis of Denise Reaume that is adopted by Waluchow to ar gue that rea soning about Char ter rights should be 'bot tom up' rather than 'top down' (p. 204 ff.) Reaume sug gests that the (stat u tory) law of dis crim i na tion should fol low a 'bot tom up' rather than a 'top down' model. She ar gues that be cause we want dis crim i na tion law to be in formed by moral con cepts such as jus tice and lib erty, it is there fore 'wise not to at tempt a com pre hen sive the ory is su ing in a pre cise net work of rules at the out set, but rather to let the im pli ca tions of the abstract prin ci ples be re vealed incrementally through confront ing fact sit u a tions on a case-by-case ba sis.' 20 Waluchow pro poses that, in the same way, the con sti tu tional law of rights evolves in small steps in which broad, gen eral prin ci ples are made pre cise in the con text of hith erto unfore seen par tic u lar cases. (One ex am ple is the way in which the Ca na dian Char ter's s.15 right to equal pro tec tion has been re fined through its ap pli ca tion to the (un fore seen) issue of same-sex mar riage. In the Halpern case, the On tario Court of Ap peal held that the tra di tional le gal un der standing of mar riage as a un ion be tween a man and a woman is a vi o la tion of the equal pro tec tion right of same-sex couples. 21 ) Al though at the be gin ning of the book, Waluchow com ments that '[a] Char ter is best viewed as a de vice for deal ing with our epistemic lim i ta tions,' (p. 11) the pro cess of com mon law rea son ing is more than an epistemic process of find ing out what the law is: it is a pro cess of 'lawmak ing.' As Schauer (quoted by Waluchow) puts it: 'common law rules are cre ated by courts si mul ta neously with the ap pli ca tion of those rules to con crete cases.' 22 Waluchow may re spond that there is an over lap ping consen sus over ab stract prin ci ples, such as the prin ci ple of equal ity, and the ques tion in an un fore seen case, such as that of same-sex mar riage, is to work out what the moral com mit ment to equal ity en tails. It is to work out -'describe'-what the con sti tu tional mo ral ity of equal ity ac tually says about same-sex mar riage, not to cre ate law in an area in which hith erto there was none. This re sponse would fly in the face of el e ments of Waluchow's own ar gu ment for the com mon law con cep tion, how ever. In de vel op ing the com mon law un der stand ing of Charters, Waluchow re lies on well-known in sights of H.L.A Hart about rules and their ap pli ca tion in un fore seen cases. 23 Hart pointed out that rules, in clud ing com mon law rules, con tain gen eral terms, and that gen eral terms are 'open tex tured;' they have the po ten tial to en coun ter vague ap pli ca tions in ac tual cases. Gen eral terms like 've hi cle' are vague be cause there are cases -like that of 'aero plane' -which are nei ther clearly ve hi cles nor clearly not ve hi cles. This is a kind of lin guis tic vague ness, and for Hart, the in de ter mi nacy re sult ing from vague ness leads to gen u ine le gal in de ter mi nacy. 24 If Hart is right, and in these cases there is a gen u ine in de ter mi nacy or gap in the law, then there is no law on the rel e vant matter. The term will have to be 'precisified' -the vague ness will have to be re solved -when the con crete case co mes before a court. More over, for Hart, the lin guis tic vague ness is a good thing, be cause, as Waluchow em pha sizes, '[w]e can some times fore see that sit u a tions are very likely to arise in which blind pre-com mit ment to a par tic u lar le gal re sult would have been fool ish or mor ally prob lem atic ' (p. 196) . Thus, there are nor ma tive rea sons as well as conceptual reasons arising from linguistic vagueness for the conclusion that common law methodology is constructive, not de scriptive.
A fur ther as pect of un fore seen cases no ticed by Hart is that the in ter pre ta tion of bor der line cases 'brings with it a rel a tive in de ter mi nacy of aim,' 25 which re quires a weigh ing up of dif fer ent and com pet ing con sid er ations. In the case of a rule 'No ve hi cles in the park' ap plied to whether a child's toy car should be per mit ted in the park, it will have to be de cided 'whether some de gree of peace in the park is to be sac ri ficed to, or de fended against, those chil dren whose plea sure or in ter est it is to use these things.' 26 Sim i larly, in the con sti tu tional con text, un fore seen cases may raise ques tions not only about whether a gen eral moral com mitment is ap pli ca ble to a par tic u lar fact sit u a tion but also about the strength, or weight, of our moral com mit ments when com pet ing in ter ests arise. A re cent ex am ple is the Cana dian case of Charkaoui. 27 It con cerned leg is la tion whose aim was to pro mote na tional se cu rity, which in ef fect allowed the in def i nite de ten tion of non-cit i zens who were suspected of ter ror ist ac tiv ity. A unan i mous (9-0) de ci sion of the Su preme Court of Can ada held that the leg is la tion was in con sis tent with the con sti tu tional right to life, lib erty and se cu rity of per son. For a pro po nent of a de scrip tive meth odol ogy, the 9-0 de ci sion could be used as ev i dence that the Court iden ti fied and de scribed a 'true' prin ci ple of con sti tutional mo ral ity, which, sim ply put, is that con sti tu tional rights must be given greater weight than con sid er ations of na tional se cu rity. This de scrip tive anal y sis how ever im plies that the leg is la ture's po si tion is inauthentic, 'mere,' opinion. Is this a plau si ble po si tion? Al ter na tively, is there a sub stan tive is sue at stake of how na tional se cu rity should be weighed against rights? I sug gest that the case is better char ac ter ized as ex em pli fy ing a con struc tive ap proach; it makes pre cise a substantive aspect of constitutional mo rality, namely the scope and weight of the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of person in national security contexts.
I have ar gued that the com mon law model of con sti tutional in ter pre ta tion that is adopted by Waluchow is best de scribed as in vok ing a con struc tive meth od ol ogy. This model pro vides a gen u ine al ter na tive to both the sub jec tive model adopted by Crit ics and the de scrip tive model adopted (im plic itly) by Waluchow him self. On the con struc tive model, rea son ing about con sti tu tional mo ral ity in con tested cases is sub stan tive nor ma tive and jus ti fi ca tory rea son ing in which in ter pret ers re fine and make pre cise our con sti tutional com mit ments by ap ply ing them to con crete cases when they arise. There is a ten sion, then, in Waluchow's ar gu ment. His no tion of con sti tu tional mo ral ity and the accom pa ny ing ex am ples pre sup pose the de scrip tive model; whereas the com mon law model of reasoning that he also endorses presupposes the constructive model.
SECTION 3. III. INAUTHENTIC VERSUS AUTHENTIC MORAL COMMITMENTS
Waluchow claims that inauthentic moral opin ions of in divid u als can not form part of a self-gov ern ing or dem o cratic con sti tu tional mo ral ity, and thus can be dis counted by legis la tors as well as judges en gag ing in ju di cial re view. It is es sen tial there fore, to un der stand pre cisely the nec es sary con di tions of inauthenticity or nonautonomy in the in di vidual case. The dis tinc tion is con tested in the rel e vant lit er ature. On some views, au ton omy is ubiq ui tous and what look like mere opin ions may be con sid ered to be au ton omous; on oth ers, true au ton omy is quite rare: an agent is truly au ton o mous only if her com mit ments cor re spond to the moral com mit ments de liv ered by our best moral the ories. Many the o rists how ever con sider that a cri te rion of a cor rect the ory of au ton omy is that it dis tin guish be tween self-rule and right-rule. 28 There must be room on a the ory of au ton omy (or au then tic ity) for agents to adopt moral po -si tions that are, from some better moral per spec tive, wrong po si tions. Oth er wise, con cep tu ally speak ing, self-rule would col lapse into right-rule. This holds for com mu ni ties as well as in di vid ual agents. Waluchow's ac knowl edges this when he says that: '[J]udges are not phi los o pher-kings with a pipe line to moral truth;' that is, he distinguishes the authentic moral commitments of a community from com mitments that are morally correct.
Let us look once again at the par a digm cases of in di vidual fail ure of au ton omy that Waluchow iden ti fies, those of the ill woman and the drunken driver. Waluchow re lies on a 're flec tive equi lib rium' anal y sis of these cases: moral opin ions are de fined as 'moral views that have not been crit i cally ex am ined so as to achieve re flec tive equi lib rium' and moral com mit ments are 'those that have ' (pp. 223-224) . How ever, the de vice of re flec tive equi lib rium, on its own, will not achieve the de sired re sult, for bring ing the opin ions and the com mit ments into equi lib rium, namely re mov ing in con sis ten cies and evaluative dis so nance, will not on its own tell us whether it is the opin ions that need to be jet tisoned or the com mit ments that need to be mod i fied to absorb the opin ions. As Waluchow points out, there must be room on these anal y ses for change in com mit ments at both the level of agents and the level of com mu nity. Waluchow's ex am ples of inauthentic moral views sug gest that there are in de pend ent epistemic con di tions that true moral com mitments must meet. Moral com mit ments -as op posed to mere opin ions -are those sat is fy ing a test of 'crit i cal ex am ina tion;' for ex am ple, they can not be the re sult of prej u dice, fear, in ad e quate ev i dence, or emo tional tur moil. If the moral view is epistemically flawed in any of these ways, it is inauthentic; it does not con sti tute a true moral com mitment and can be dis re garded. The com mit ment that one should not drink and drive sat is fies the test. It is for mulated by a ra tio nal, in formed, clear-headed agent. On the other hand, the de sire to drive while drunk is for mu lated by an agent whose mind is clouded by al co hol. Thus, bring ing the two de sires into equi lib rium en tails re ject ing the lat ter. The ill woman ex am ple is per haps less clear be cause it may be a ra tio nal re sponse to se vere pain of ill ness to mod ify one's com mit ment to the sanc tity of life. How ever, it can be sup posed that the ill woman is tem po rarily in the grip of fear or emotional disturbance and therefore that the wish to die fails the test of critical examination and does not express her true character.
In this sec tion, I de velop the fol low ing re sponse to Waluchow's po si tion. The 'crit i cal ex am i na tion' test of authen tic ity can be un der stood in ei ther of two ways. The first is as a test that re quires agents' rea son ing to sat isfy purely epistemic or non-moral con di tions; the sec ond is as a test that re quires agents' rea son ing to sat isfy some moral con dition or con di tions in ad di tion to the epistemic, non-moral con di tions. If it is un der stood as a purely epistemic or non-moral test, then rea son ing based on prej u dice and hatred will not count as inauthentic. How ever, if it is un derstood as in part a moral test, then this will un der mine Waluchow's purely pro ce dural con cep tion of dem o cratic self-governance. I look at each option in turn.
Sup pose first that Waluchow's test is a purely epistemic or non-moral test. If so, it would fall into a cat e gory of the ories of au ton omy I will call pro ce dural, namely those claiming that it is nec es sary and suf fi cient for au ton omy that an agent's pro cesses of pref er ence-for ma tion com ply with certain non-moral, or pro ce dural, con di tions. 29 A prom i nent ex am ple of a pro ce dural the ory is the po si tion that the feature nec es sary for au ton o mous rea son ing is an agent's iden ti fi ca tion or en dorse ment. On Harry Frank furt's fa mous the ory, this is spelt out us ing dif fer ent lev els of the self. 30 Au ton omy or au then tic ity, with re spect to a lower-level fea - 30 Frank furt 1971. Frank furt has mod i fied his postion sev eral times since this pa per but these mod i fi ca tions need not con cern us here. Ger ald Dworkin ar tic ulated a sim i lar po si tion in Dworkin 1970 Dworkin , 1988 . See Tay lor 2005 for an over view.
ture of the self (that is, a de sire, opin ion, or pref er ence), is the en dorse ment of the lower-level fea ture by one at a higher-level. In the ab sence of such en dorse ment, the agent is, as Frank furt puts it, a 'pas sive by stander' with re spect to the lower-level fea ture of the self. So, for ex am ple, on this the ory the ill woman's de sire to die is au ton o mous if and only if it is en dorsed at a higher level; that is, if and only if she also has a de sire to de sire to die. Since by hy poth e sis she does not have this higher-or der de sire, her de sire to die is not au ton o mous. Sim i larly, the drunken driver does not en dorse his lower-level de sire to drive when drunk, and hence the lat ter is also not au ton o mous. A sec ond kind of ex am ple is Sa rah Buss's claim that au ton omy is un dermined when an agent's rea son ing pro cesses are un healthy or dis torted. She writes that 'the key to... self-gov ern ing agency is the dis tinc tion be tween a healthy hu man be ing and a hu man be ing who suf fers from some psy cho log i cal or phys i o log i cal "af flic tion" (e.g., in tense pain, fear, anx i ety, fatigue, de pres sion, and ob ses sion).' 31 On this ap proach, the con di tions re quired for au ton omy are -de lib er ately -not par tic u larly strin gent. An agent who suf fers an af flic tion that is se vere enough to dis tort and pathologize her ca pacity for rea son ing is nonautonomous; oth er wise her rea soning is au ton o mous. (On this po si tion, the drunken driver would be ruled as nonautonomous, but the ill woman may or may not suf fer from a suf fi ciently se vere af flic tion -it would de pend on the de tails of the case.) A im por tant feature of both ac counts of au ton omy is that they are 'content-neu tral.' 32 Pref er ences or opin ions are not ruled au tono mous or nonautonomous on the ba sis of their con tents; rather, it is an agent's healthy or unhealthy condition, or the attitude that she adopts to her preferences, that provide 124 NATALIE STOLJAR 31 Buss 2005 , p. 215. See also Raz 1986 in which he de scribes a woman on a desert is land who is hounded by a wild an i mal. Raz's 'hounded woman' suf fers an af flic tion of this kind. 32 For dis cus sions of the no tion of con tent-neu tral ity, see Christman 1990 and Benson 1994. the keys to whether her reasoning is autonomous in a particular case.
It is not ob vi ous, how ever, that Waluchow's ex am ple at the com mu nity level -that of the pref er ence to deny the Venu sian mi nor ity the right to use their own lan guage -would count as nonautonomous on ei ther of these ac counts of auton omy, or on pro ce dural ac counts in gen eral. Re call Waluchow's ar gu ment that the lan guage law fails the crit ical ex am i na tion con di tion be cause: 'we have dis like, prej udice and ha tred fu elled by fear, to gether with a de mand for ac tion that in tro duces sig nif i cant evaluative dis sonance…(p. 104). Nei ther the 'af flicted agent' ac count, nor the en dorse ment ac count, would treat prej u diced opin ions as inauthentic. Prej u dice -in brief, the un jus ti fied or ar bitrary be lief that an in di vid ual or a group is less mor ally wor thy -may be a moral fail ing, but it is not a phys i cal or psy cho log i cal af flic tion; nor, un for tu nately, is it im pos si ble for agents to au then ti cally adopt and en dorse such flawed moral be liefs. In puts into the dem o cratic con sen sus that are the result of prejudice and hatred are not inauthentic on these common theories of autonomy.
Cer tain con di tions on Waluchow's list -those of emotional tur moil and ig no rance, for ex am ple -can readily be in cluded among the pro ce dural con di tions of au ton omy. How ever, oth ers, like that of prej u dice, are 'overinclusive.' Con sider, for in stance, White su prem a cist mi nor i ties in the United States, Can ada or else where, whose be liefs are incom pat i ble with the con sti tu tional mo ral ity of those countries. The be liefs of White su prem a cists are based on prej udice and ha tred. But are such be liefs, for that rea son, inauthentic and fail ures of self-gov ern ment? It would seem not. First, our in tu itions about the 'true' char ac ter of White su prem a cists sug gest that it is pre cisely the prej u diced, rac ist be liefs that make them what they are. Sec ondly, char ac ter iz ing White su prem a cist be liefs as inauthentic, that is, as not an ex pres sion of the in di vid ual's free agency, cre ates a prima fa cie prob lem for the at tri bu tion of moral re spon si bil ity to agents who hold these be liefs. 33 Yet, it seems that White su prem a cists are mor ally re spon si ble for their be liefs and for any ac tions taken as a re sult of those be liefs. Thirdly, sup pose White su prem a cists set up a so ciety in which their be liefs are per mis si ble un der the so ci ety's mo ral ity. Be cause the so ci ety's mo ral ity is based on prej udice and ha tred, it does not sat isfy the crit i cal ex am i na tion test, and so it does not ex hibit dem o cratic self-gov er nance or au then tic con sti tu tional mo ral ity. How ever, Waluchow claims that so ci et ies like this one -Nazi Ger many and apart heid South Af rica-would have a con sti tu tional moral ity, al beit a mor ally re pug nant one. These ob ser va tions sug gest, then, that prej u dice, or rather lack of prejudice, should not be included as one of the epistemic conditions in Waluchow's critical examination test.
If lack of prej u dice is not in cluded as a nec es sary con dition in the test of au then tic ity, Waluchow's ex am ple seems less con vinc ing. Con sider again the pref er ence of the ma jority in De mos to deny the mi nor ity Ve nu sians the right to use their own lan guage. Sup pose this pref er ence is the result of prej u dice against Ve nu sians as well as lack of in forma tion both about the im por tance of lan guage to the minor ity, and about the im pli ca tions for free dom of ex pres sion of de ny ing lan guage rights. Be cause of the epistemic flaws in the ma jor ity's rea son ing, the pref er ence fails the crit i cal ex am i na tion test and hence is inauthentic on Waluchow's ac count. Now imag ine a vari a tion on the case. Sup pose that the sup port ers of lan guage rights mount a pub lic cam paign -much like an elec tion cam paign -on be half of the Ve nusians. As a re sult, news pa pers, ra dio and tele vi sion are satu rated with ad ver tise ments in sup port of lan guage rights; they broad cast doc u men ta ries and news items about the unique lan guage and cul ture of the Ve nu sians; and they re -port on and dis cuss the pol i tics of the cam paign. Sup pose the cam paign is pur sued over a pe riod of weeks or months so that it is rea son able to think that the ma jor ity is as well-in formed as non-spe cial ists in a so ci ety can be about their po lit i cal choices. Nev er the less, al though some members of the ma jor ity change their minds, the re main der is un per suaded. For them, the in for ma tion avail able does not have the de sired ef fect of over rid ing their prej u dices; the mi nor ity's rights are not suf fi ciently im por tant to out weigh their own con cerns. In other words, pref er ences to deny rights to mi nor i ties -even those based in prej u dice -can not al ways be treated as inauthentic. Once these preferences satisfy a (non-moral) test, they constitute genuine moral commitments, and hence the problem of substantive disagreement over rights reappears.
If how ever lack of prej u dice is re tained as one of the neces sary con di tions of crit i cal ex am i na tion, this brings us to the sec ond pos si bil ity men tioned above, that the test of authen tic ity adopted by Waluchow is re ally a moral one. Preju dice is blind ness of a sort, but it is not sim ply epistemic blind ness, which would be cured given better epistemic con di tions. Prej u dice is blind ness to oth ers' moral worth. The claim that opin ions based on prej u dice are inauthentic im plic itly in tro duces a moral cri te rion into the the ory of auton omy. Opin ions with cer tain moral con tents -namely that mem bers of mi nor i ties have lesser or in sig nif i cant moral worth -are judged to be inauthentic. Al though such a sub stan tive po si tion is in prin ci ple de fen si ble, it com mits Waluchow, I think, to a cor re spond ing sub stan tive no tion of de moc racy. It also brings Waluchow's position close to that of Ronald Dworkin.
Dworkin also ar gues that in puts into a dem o cratic moral con sen sus must sat isfy cer tain epistemic con di tions to be le git i mate. Al though he does not rely on the no tion of inauthentic opin ions, the struc ture of his ar gu ment par allels that of Waluchow. In the con text of a fa mous de bate with Lord Devlin over the criminalization of ho mo sex u al ity, Dworkin asks: What is it to speak of a group's mo ral ity or moral be liefs? What are the nec es sary con di tions of a le git imate moral con sen sus? For Dworkin, some rea sons (in puts) are dis qual i fied from the dem o cratic moral con sen sus, and, the nec es sary con di tions of dis qual i fied rea sons are pri marily epistemic. For ex am ple, rea sons are dis qual i fied if they are prej u diced be liefs, that is, be liefs that 'a mem ber of a class au to mat i cally de serves less re spect, with out re gard to any thing he him self has done'; 34 per sonal emo tional re actions, such as dis gust; be liefs based on false facts; or parroted be liefs adopted from oth ers, such as 'ev ery one knows ho mo sex u al ity is a sin.' 35 On this test, nei ther the moral con sen sus of Nazi Ger many nor that of apart heid South Africa would be dem o crat i cally le git i mate be cause, in both these so ci et ies, it was be lieved that cer tain classes of peo ple de served less re spect. There is, then, a moral claim built into Dworkin's test of a le git i mate dem o cratic con sen sus; and in the same way, Waluchow's test of crit i cal ex am i nation, when it is un der stood as in clud ing a lack of prej u dice condition, is not purely epistemic but moral as well.
The main con clu sion to be drawn here is that, if Waluchow's test of au then tic ity is to do the work it is required to do -namely, clas sify pref er ences de ny ing rights to mi nor i ties as inauthentic -it must be con strued as a moral test. The dis tinc tion be tween inauthentic moral opin ions and au then tic moral com mit ments is a moral dis tinc tion. What fol lows for Waluchow's ar gu ment about de moc racy? In one re spect his ar gu ment re mains in tact: he can continue to claim that inauthentic pref er ences are not gen uinely self-gov ern ing and there fore majoritarian pro cess that em ploy inauthentic pref er ences are not dem o crat i cally le giti mate. How ever, be cause au then tic ity it self is a moral concept, this po si tion will pre sup pose a sub stan tive con cep tion of de moc racy not a purely pro ce dural one. Majoritarian proce dures will be judged inauthentic and hence not dem o -cratic if they vi o late some moral con di tion, for ex am ple if they ex hibit that mor ally criticizable at ti tude of prej u dice. So the ul ti mate test of de moc racy, on this alternative, is a substantive moral one as well.
IV. CONCLUSION. BACK TO THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Charters and Bills of Rights enu mer ate ab stract moral prin ci ples. On the liv ing tree model, our un der stand ing of the ab stract prin ci ples will evolve and be re fined as over time they are ap plied to un fore seen cases. I have ar gued that this pro cess is con struc tive, evaluative and jus ti fi catory. Each step in the evo lu tion of prin ci ples re quires a sub stan tive de ci sion about the scope or weight of rights. This does not en tail, how ever, that it is a sub jec tive pro cess in which the rea soner de cides the ques tion ac cord ing to her own par tic u lar ends or in ter ests. I also sug gested that the pref er ences of con cern to Waluchow -namely, pref er ences that seem to deny con sti tu tional rights to mi nor i ties -cannot plau si bly be an a lyzed as inauthentic un less we adopt a moral no tion of au then tic ity. It fol lows that, even if we classify some dis agree ments over rights as dis agree ments between inauthentic opin ions and au then tic com mit ments, these dis agree ments are nev er the less moral dis agree ments. In cases in which courts take a side in the dis agree ment that is not en dorsed by the ma jor ity through the legislature, this implicitly imposes a moral constraint on majoritarian procedures.
How do these con clu sions af fect the ques tion of the le git imacy of ju di cial re view? The an swer de pends in part on the an swer to the sim ple ques tion posed at the be gin ning: are ma jor i ties in de moc ra cies sub ject to moral con straints derived from fun da men tal rights? For those who say 'yes,' the ques tion of the jus ti fi ca tion of ju di cial re view is to a large ex tent an em pir i cal -or in stru men tal -one. For in stance Jo seph Raz says that we should adopt 'which ever po lit i cal pro ce dure is most likely, in the cir cum stances of the time and place, to en force [rights] well, with the few est ad verse side-ef fects.' 36 The ju di ciary should not be ide al ized, but nei ther should the leg is la ture. As Waluchow points out at the end of the book, we need to look at the 'con texts of de cision' for dif fer ent pro ce dures: the ju di cial and legislative contexts are different in crucial ways (pp. 255 ff.).
Even for those who say 'no,' it does not fol low that ju dicial re view is a flawed pro ce dure. It is pos si ble for the proce dure of ju di cial re view to it self be adopted by majoritarian pro cesses; 37 the dem o cratic le git i macy of ju di cial re view would not, there fore arise ex nihilo, but rather through dele ga tion of power to the ju di ciary by the ma jor ity. Waluchow men tions one com pel ling rea son for this: the 'bot tom up' meth od ol ogy of con struc tive in ter pre ta tion in which mat ters are de cided incrementally can not 'eas ily or sen si bly be dealt with…by an al ready over worked leg is la ture. The lat ter would likely be swamped were it to as sume, in ad di tion to its al ready oner ous du ties, the ad di tional re spon si bil ity to de cide all un fore seen hard cases…' (p. 262). Thus, al though work will have to be done to es tab lish that ju di cial re view is a better de ci sion pro ce dure, this is not -as Critics have sometimes claimed -an impossible task. Raz 1998, p. 45 . See Waldron's dis cus sion of Raz's po si tion and those of others re ly ing on 'out come-re lated' rea sons in Waldron 2006, pp. 37 Christiano 2000, p. 521. Christiano imag ines a sit u a tion such as a consitutional con ven tion in which there is higher-or der agree ment to in sti tute a lower-or der non-majoritarian pro ce dure: 'It is a con tin gent fact, dependingon the views and in ter ests of those who choose the low est or der pro ce dures, whether they choose a majoritarian pro ce dure or not' (Christiano 2000, p. 521) .
